













 The distinctions between single member plurality systems and proportional 
representation systems are well known among students of electoral systems.  The 
contrast between these two ‘ideal’ types is such that most students can effortlessly list a 
litany of political consequences emanating from the choice of either of these systems, 
including the impact on the number of parties, coalition government, cabinet durability, 
etc.  But beyond the ideal types, there continue to be interesting puzzles that capture 
scholarly attention.   One of these puzzles which this edited volume focuses on is the 
question of why countries with seemingly similar electoral systems have different 
outcomes.  In the first chapter of this book, Batto and Cox observe that while Japan and 
Taiwan both have adopted mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems, the 
countries have differed in the number of parties in their party systems.   In this chapter, 
we extend the discussion of mixed-member systems to include the Asia-Pacific’s one 
case of a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system, New Zealand.  
 A particular puzzle of the New Zealand experience with MMP is that, over the 
years the system has been in place, the effective number of electoral parties has generally 
declined. This trend is evident in spite of an electoral system design that is highly 
proportional, and stands in contrast to the mostly similar case of Germany, where recent 
elections have seen a rise in the effective number of parties. Moreover, in New Zealand, 
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unlike both the East Asian and German cases, the number of very small parties is high. 
We argue that the persistence of these “micro-parties” in New Zealand can be understood 
only by taking into account both specific features of its MMP system and politicians’ 
pursuit of ministerial posts. Thus we agree with Batto and Cox, in this volume, that the 
electoral system and its effects on legislative competition provide only a partial 
explanation. We must also consider the contribution of executive-centric explanations. 
 In their comparison of Japan and Taiwan, Batto and Cox stress those two 
countries’ different executive formats--semi-presidential in Taiwan but parliamentary in 
Japan. They also stress another factor, intra-party factions competing for executive posts, 
including at the sub-national level in the case of Taiwan. New Zealand, like Germany, is 
a parliamentary system, and neither of these MMP countries has anything like the 
entrenched factional competition of Japan and Taiwan. Rather, when there are internal 
party disagreements, they must either be worked out within the confines of the party, or 
else the party splits. The establishment of new parties out of divisions in old ones has 
been a factor in both Germany and New Zealand. In the former case, a substantial upward 
push to the effective number of parties occurred when the leading party of the center-left, 
the Social Democrats, split and the defectors merged with the ex-Communists of the old 
East Germany to form the Left Party. The formation of the Left was thus the result of a 
policy-based split in a then-governing party.2. In New Zealand, however, most splinters 
have been ambitious seekers of ministerial posts who use their safe seats to launch new 
parties. The main exception is the Green Party of Aoteroa New Zealand, which emerged 
out of the turmoil of the left-wing Alliance3
 In this chapter, we examine the New Zealand experience of its mixed-member 
proportional system and suggest that to explain the political consequences witnessed in 
New Zealand requires us to examine both the mechanical effects of electoral rules, 
including features specific to New Zealand’s variant of MMP, as well as the incentives of 
politicians to seek ministerial posts outside of the main parties.  In the next section, we 
 in the early years of the new electoral 
system and subsequently established itself as an alternative policy-seeking party. 
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offer an overview of the system’s performance over its first six elections, and then 
discuss issues relevant to the 2011 referendum on the electoral system.  In the 
subsequent section, we re-state the theoretical predictions of the effects of a shift from its 
former First Past the Post or also known as Single Member Plurality (SMP)4
 
 system to 
MMP on the party system and its competitiveness, on the impact on coalition formation, 
and the “contamination effects” (Herron and Nishikawa 2001) between the plurality and 
PR components of the system.  We argue that the number of parties in New Zealand 
under MMP, averaged across six elections, is consistent with what electoral systems 
theory should lead us to expect. However, were it not for peculiar features of the New 
Zealand system, and the presence of what we term “legacy politicians” seeking to obtain 
ministerial positions, we would be unlikely to observe as many very small parties as we 
have in New Zealand. We also find that in recent elections, there is decreasing evidence 
of “contamination” as the two tiers have diverged in their effective number of parties 
(two-party dominance of plurality races, but higher fragmentation in the PR tier)--a 
pattern quite different from what has emerged in the German MMP system, especially 
recently. Finally, we explore the “intra-party dimension” (Shugart 2005), where we find 
evidence for a different kind of contamination, whereby dual candidacy appears to 
encourage even legislators elected via the party lists to behave almost as if they 
represented a local district.  
New Zealand under MMP  
 Ten years after the Royal Commission published its report, Towards a Better 
Democracy, in 1996 New Zealand conducted its first parliamentary elections under MMP.  
In Table 1, we see the results of the elections under MMP since 1996. It is immediately 
evident that many more parties have run for, and won, parliamentary seats under this 
proportional electoral system. Moreover, no party has won more than half the seats, in 
stark contrast to the SMP system prior to 1996. Table 1 further shows the breakdown for 
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each party between seats won via the nominal tier, which is made up of 60-70 (depending 
on the year) single-seat districts (known as electorates in New Zealand), and the list tier.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Under New Zealand’s MMP system, only parties that win at least 5% of the party 
vote, or at least one district, may participate in the distribution of list seats. The 
consequences of this provision can be seen also in the 2008 results, when New Zealand 
First won 4.1% of the party votes, but no seats, yet ACT won five seats on only 3.7% of 
the party vote. Both parties obviously failed to clear the 5% threshold, yet the reason 
ACT won seats is that one of its electorate candidates won his contest. Having thus 
qualified for representation (in effect, waiving the party-vote threshold), this party was 
eligible to win full compensation via the list, electing another four MPs. 
 We can quickly contrast MMP in New Zealand (and the broadly similar system in 
Germany) with the Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM) type otherwise more common 
in the Asia-Pacific region.5
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
  Table 2 compares two MMM systems (Japan and Taiwan) 
and two MMP (New Zealand and Germany) on the widely accepted measure of 
disproportionality, Gallagher’s Least Squares Index. The lower the number, the more 
proportional the result. Germany is shown separately for both the pre-1990 West 
Germany and the post-unification period from 1990 on, when disproportionality has 
tended to be somewhat higher. The two MMM systems have sharply higher 
disproportionality; in fact, Japan’s lowest value (8.52 in 2003) is substantially higher than 
the highest value observed under MMP in Germany or New Zealand. Thus Table 2 shows 
very clearly the mechanical effect of MMP vs. MMM.  
 
The 2011 Referendum on Whether to Retain MMP 
 Fifteen years after New Zealand adopted the mixed member proportional 
representation (MMP) system, on November 26, 2011, New Zealanders were asked in a 
referendum whether they would like to keep or replace the mixed member proportional 
representation system (MMP).  Though the referendum was largely overshadowed by 
the concurrent parliamentary election, the lead up to the referendum and the general 
                                                 




election created the normal buzz of electioneering and campaigning amongst proponents 
and opponents of MMP.  Despite some misgivings about MMP, 57.8 percent of the 
voters voted to keep it. 
 One of the provisions of the law mandating the referendum was that, were MMP 
to be retained, there would be a mandatory review of ways to “improve” it. The Electoral 
Commission carried out an independent review in 2012, which included opportunities for 
public submissions and hearings on several aspects of the system. The review addressed 
the level of the threshold for earning proportional seats, the question of dual candidacy 
(i.e. candidates running in both tiers), and several other matters (see Electoral 
Commission, 2012).  It specifically was not permitted to consider the size of parliament 
or the provisions for representation of the country’s indigenous Maori minority.  The 
Electoral Commission, in its final report released in August, 2012, recommended modest 
changes: reducing the threshold from 5 to 4 percent, abolishing the alternative one-
district threshold, and abolishing the provision of overhang seats for parties not reaching 
the threshold.6
 The mean reason for holding a referendum on the electoral system is that the 
National Party had promised to review the system before coming back to power in 2008, 
and even accused Labour of having reneged on an earlier promise to undertake a review. 
That National would have greater skepticism about the MMP system is comprehensible 
as MMP is more disadvantageous to a center-right party that draws its support mainly 
from conservative, rural, and upper middle class and wealthy New Zealanders in a 
country whose median voter is more left of center.  Moreover, it has consolidated the 
center-right vote to the extent that it won 44.9% in 2008 and 47.3% in 2011, in contrast to 
 Any changes would have to be approved by parliament.  We will 
address several of the Commission’s findings and recommendations in the course of this 
chapter. 
                                                 
6 An “overhang” results when a party with less than five percent of the party-list vote obtains at least one 
district seat. Under current practice, not only does such a party qualify for list seats, but if its number of 
districts won exceeds its proportional share (of 120), the size of parliament is expanded to account for the 
overhangs. The Electoral Commission proposed ending both practices. In addition, it recommended 
retaining the status quo for by-election candidacy, dual candidacy (which we discuss below), and ordering 




Labour’s average of around 40% in the three straight MMP elections in which it was the 
largest party. Thus National is in a strong position to win parliamentary majorities under 
a non-proportional system, whereas such a system could pose coordination challenges to 
the center-left, particularly given the rise in strength of the Green Party since 2002 (see 
Table 1).7
  
 The majority support in the referendum probably closes for some time any 
further consideration of replacing MMP. 
 
Effects on the Number of Parties 
 New Zealand was a quintessential example of a Westminster majoritarian 
parliamentary democracy.  With the SMP electoral system, pre-1996 governments were 
solidly single-party majority governments controlled by one of just two dominant parties.  
 It is, however, important not to overstate the “two-partyness” of New Zealand 
politics from the 1970s on. Several elections under SMP resulted in substantial vote 
shares for parties other than Labour and National. Nonetheless, the mechanical effect of 
plurality seat-allocation, and the lack of significant regional strongholds for any of the 
smaller parties, meant that parliament remained almost completely the preserve of the 
two big parties. In fact, in elections via SMP after 1945, the maximum number of parties 
with seats in any election was three until 1993, when four parties won seats in the final 
SMP election, which was concurrent with the referendum in which MMP was approved. 
Even more to the point, in none of these elections did the third party win more than two 
seats. 
 In New Zealand’s elections under SMP, majority governments always resulted, 
although often based on only around 40% of the votes. Thus we can say that the 
mechanical effect was working as expected from Duverger’s Law, forcing the real choice 
to be between just two parties. Nonetheless the “psychological effect” had less impact 
over time. In every election from 1960 on, the third party (usually Social Credit) won 
over 6% of the vote, and from 1984 on, with the exception of the 1987 election, the third 
largest party always had anywhere from 12% to a high of more than 20%. Thus voters 
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showed some willingness to vote for third parties that had no realistic chance of winning 
significant numbers of seats, let alone any governing influence.   
 Of course, as expected, a move to a proportional system starting in 1996 has 
meant that many parties can earn representation, even with relatively small vote shares, 
as Table 1 showed. New Zealand’s sixth parliament of the MMP era, elected in 2011, has 
eight political parties represented.  The National, Labour, and Green parties account for 
107 of the 121 parliamentary seats, leaving fourteen additional seats divided amongst five 
parties. The 2011 election is not an outlier: As Table 3 shows, the number of 
parliamentary parties has been between six and eight since 1996.  This is a stark contrast 
to the two or three parties represented in elections under SMP.   
 The relatively high number of parliamentary parties under MMP, however, masks 
the imbalance in parliamentary representation amongst them.  To take account of the 
relative sizes of parties, the most common index is the ”effective” number of 
parliamentary parties (Ns) index, presented in Table 3, which counts the parties by 
weighting them by their sizes.  For New Zealand’s six elections under MMP, Ns was at 
its highest in the first MMP election of 1996 (3.76) and was as low as 2.78 in 2008. It has 
averaged 3.28. It is evident from these statistics that New Zealand, as predicted by theory, 
has moved away from two-party dominance to a multi-party parliamentary system.  In 
comparison to the raw number of parliamentary parties, the lower effective number 
reflects the presence of two strong parties, plus various smaller parties. As a result, 
coalition negotiations have always revolved around one of the big parties, Labour or 
National, and various smaller partners, as we discuss in detail later. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 How does the presence of 6–8 parties winning at least one seat, but an effective 
number of parliamentary parties averaging just over three compare to what might be 
expected from an electoral system like New Zealand’s? We will address this question 
from two perspectives: first, comparing to the only long-established MMP system prior to 
New Zealand, that of Germany; second, by reference to theoretical work in comparative 
electoral systems.  
 Germany’s postwar electoral system is similar to that adopted by New Zealand in 




in a single-member district and one for a party list.; overall proportionality is calculated 
nationwide based on party-list votes for those parties clearing a nationwide threshold of 
five percent.8 While the number of parties earning at least one seat was higher in the first 
elections, from 1961 on every election resulted in four parties in the Bundestag (Christian 
Democratic Union, Christian Social Union,9
 Thus, even with the recent increase in the number of parties in the German 
parliament to six, that country continues to have fewer parties with parliamentary 
representation than New Zealand has had in any election since 1999. Nonetheless, in 
Germany since reunification the effective number of parties in parliament has been higher: 
taking the seven elections from 1990, Ns values have been 3.17, 3.45, 3.31, 3.38, 4.05, 
4.83, 2.80.
 Social Democratic Party, and Free 
Democratic Party) until 1983, when the Green Party surpassed the threshold for the first 
time. Since reunification in 1990, there have been six parties, with the former East 
German Communist Party, renamed the Party of Democratic Socialism, joining the mix. 
This latter party combined with a left-wing splinter from the Social Democrats before the 
2002 election to form the Left Party, keeping the number of represented parties at six as 
of 2009.  
10 The generally upward trend until the last election in that sequence (2013)11 
is notable, and contrasts with the more erratic but recently downward trend in New 
Zealand’s MMP era (Table 3). By contrast, in the last six elections in Germany before 
reunification, 1969–87, Ns averaged only 2.99 and was over 3.00 only in 1980 and 
1983.12
                                                 
8 As in New Zealand, there is a provision for overhang seats (überhangmandate). A key difference in 
Germany is that even though overall proportional entitlements to parties are determined nationwide, the 
overhangs are determined within each state. 
 Thus in terms of the effective number of parliamentary parties, New Zealand 
9 As is typical, we count the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union as separate parties. 
The latter competes only in Bavaria, whereas the former competes in the rest of the country. The two act as 
a single party in parliament. 
10 If we were to count the CDU and CSU as one party, these figures would be about .84 as high, on average 
(3.97 in 2009). All but the 1990 figure (2.65) would remain higher than any value in New Zealand under 
MMP. 
11 Ns fell in 2013 in large part due to the Free Democratic Party failing to clear the threshold. 




since 2005 looks more like Germany in the 1970s and 1980s than like the latter country’s 
more recent elections However, the more recent increase in Germany’s effective number, 
particularly in the first decade of the 2000s, should serve as a reminder that an effective 
number near three, such as New Zealand has had recently, is not necessarily what we 
should expect as “typical” under MMP.  
 A further puzzle in comparing these two MMP systems lies in the fact that New 
Zealand’s actual number of parties having at least one seat is somewhat higher, while its 
effective number is, especially recently, lower than in Germany. The main factor driving 
this difference is that most of the minor parties in New Zealand tend to be exceptionally 
small parties, sometimes earning only one or a few seats each.  As we will discuss in 
more detail below, a key reason that New Zealand has some very small parties, but 
Germany does not, is that in New Zealand a party that falls below the 5% party-vote 
threshold nonetheless qualifies for proportional representation seats if it wins just one 
district. In Germany, a party below the threshold needs three district pluralities.13 Only 
once since the 1950s has a party in Germany entered parliament despite not clearing the 
party-vote threshold.14
                                                 
13 It is worth noting that, due to the difference in parliament sizes, Germany’s alternative threshold of three 
districts won is not clearly higher than New Zealand’s one district. Germany’s was equivalent to about 
1.2% of total districts before reunification but is about 0.5% of districts in the larger post-unification 
Bundestag. New Zealand’s is around 1.4% of districts. Nonetheless, it is presumably more difficult for a 
very small party to find three candidates capable of winning districts--assuming it is not a party focused on 
a regional cleavage--than it is to have one such candidate. In the case of New Zealand, as we discuss later, 
that one candidate is often the party founder who already held the seat with one of the larger parties in the 
pre-MMP era. 
 In New Zealand, there have been four such parties in each of the 
three most recent elections (2005, 2008, 2011). Except for the Maori Party (discussed 
below), each of these parties has entered parliament by winning just one district seat; 
some of these have then qualified for anywhere from one to four additional seats from the 
14 In 1994, the Party of Democratic Socialism won three districts in the formerly Communist east, but only 
4.4% if the nationwide party vote. In 1990, it won representation with only 2.4% of the nationwide party 
vote, but at that election there was a one-time variance in the threshold: a party had to win 5% in only one 





 How about expectations based on theory of electoral systems? We can draw on 
the work of Taagepera (2007), who has taken the institutional constraints of “simple” 
electoral systems as a starting point for estimating logically what the number of parties 
“should be”, on average. Of course, a mixed-member proportional system is not simple, 
in that it has two tiers of allocation. However, ignoring for a moment the threshold, New 
Zealand’s MMP does allocate seats as if it were one district of 120 seats. Given 
nationwide calculation of seat shares from party votes, and further given the possibility of 
a party winning a seat with a vote share much less than the 5% threshold (by winning just 
one district), treating the system as a national district without a threshold is not wildly off, 
even if it is an oversimplification. If we use these simple assumptions, Taagepera's Seat 
Product
 Only once has the number of parties clearing the party-vote threshold 
exceeded five; starting in 2005, just three or four have done so. Thus, were it not for 
small parties winning districts in New Zealand, the number of parties would be 
substantially lower.  
16 leads to a prediction of 11 parties winning at least one seat, and effective 
Ns=4.90. However, of course, there is a threshold. In a more recent work (Taagepera, 
unpublished), models are derived estimating the number of parties, both actual and 
effective, from a nationwide threshold. Applying these models17
 Given that we don't know which threshold is more constraining, one-district or 
5% party-vote, a logical extension of Taagepera's technique would be to take the 
geometric mean of the two predictions. That leads to: 
 to New Zealand’s 5% 
threshold, we get an estimate of 4.47 parties winning at least one seat and effective 
Ns=2.71. 
 Actual number of parties,  sqrt(11*4.5) = 7.0 
 Effective number of parliamentary parties (Ns),  sqrt(4.9*2.7) = 3.6 
                                                 
15 In practice, a party that has one district win needs about 1.5% of the party vote to qualify for a second 
seat. 
16 The Seat Product is the average district magnitude (M) multiplied by the size of the assembly (S). 
Taagepera’s models predict that the number of seat-winning parties (of any size) is the fourth root of the 
Seat Product, while the effective number is the sixth root: Ns=(MS)1/6. 
17 Actual parties are approximated by the inverse square root of the threshold (expressed in fractions rather 




 These derived estimates closely match the observed average values (Table 3): 7.2 
actual parties and an effective number of 3.28. We have too few elections to work with 
here to say for sure that it is not just by chance that the number of parties (effective or 
otherwise) comes close to predictions derived from our application of Taagepera’s 
methods, but the conclusion we can draw is that the number of parties is not “too high” in 
New Zealand, given institutional constraints.18
 
 Moreover, as Table 3 showed, the 
effective number of parties has not been greater than 2.98 for the last three elections. This 
value is closer to what we expect from the 5% threshold itself. Such a value is also 
consistent with the idea of the two major parties reasserting themselves via the district-
level Duvergerian effect. If such an effect is also carrying over to the party-list ballot, it 
would be an argument for a “contamination” effect, which is a theme we return to below. 
Effects on government formation 
 As a result of the greater number of parties in New Zealand under MMP, all 
governments since 1996 have been multiparty coalition cabinets (and most have been 
minority governments).  Indeed, New Zealand’s experience is quite similar to 
Germany’s:  two large parties holding positions just to the right and left of center and a 
group of smaller parties.  Like Germany as well, the two large parties have taken turns 
leading the government, although New Zealand has not had a “grand coalition” of the 
two big parties as Germany has experienced three times (following elections of 196 , 
2005, and 2013).  A substantial difference from the German experience is that every 
government in Germany has consisted of just three or four parties19
                                                 
18 In Germany, given the greater difficulty of a small party winning despite being below the threshold, one 
would want to use only the threshold-based models. An estimated 4.47 parties (of any size) in parliament is 
close to the recently observed 5, but the observed effective number is now much higher than the estimated 
2.71. Perhaps it is Germany, and not the newer MMP case of New Zealand, that is the hard case to explain! 
 while in New 
Zealand most governments have entailed formalized cooperation between one big party 
19 The minimum in any one cabinet has been three if we count the two Christian Democratic parties (CDU 
and CSU) separately. While they always have entered government or gone into opposition as if they were 




and an additional two or three smaller parties. Often each of the small parties has only 
one or a few seats in parliament.  
 In this section, we go beyond the analysis of the electoral system to consider how 
incentives for seeking executive posts have affected the number of parties. We draw on 
the insights of Batto and Cox (introduction, this volume), who aptly remind us that the 
pursuit of executive posts may have an independent effect. Batto and Cox note that in 
parliamentary systems competition for executive posts allows for a mixture of both 
electoral and post-electoral strategies.  In New Zealand, post-electoral strategies have 
been common,20
 
 as small parties, often founded from splinters off the main parties, have 
been influential in the government-formation process. We will first outline the main 
features of New Zealand’s inter-party bargaining, and then offer an explanation grounded 
in specific features of the country’s MMP system and the pursuit of executive posts to 
explain these patterns.  
Coalition and Minority Governments 
 As can be observed from Table 4, the number of political parties in coalition 
governments has increased after 1999.  As we will discuss later in this section, New 
Zealand parties have come up with creative arrangements other than outright coalition 
cabinets, such as the confidence and supply agreements21
                                                 
20 This is in partial contrast to Japan and Taiwan, where pre-electoral alliances have been more common. 
 or ministers outside of cabinet. 
Despite the recent prevalence of such arrangements, we can still speak of coalitions, of 
varying degrees of formality, between one major party and multiple smaller ones that 
have received ministerial posts. In many of these cases, the parties in coalition 
agreements have only one to three MPs, and have depended not on clearing the five-
percent threshold, but rather winning at least one district seat, to be in parliament. 
Examples of parties with ministerial posts but less than 5% of the vote include 
Progressive in 2002 and 2005, United Future in 2005-11, and both ACT and the Maori 
Party in 2008 and 2011. In fact, of the parties cooperating in government with either 
National or Labour since MMP was enacted, only New Zealand First in 1996 and 2005, 
21 Such agreements state that a minor party will not vote against the government in motions of confidence 




Alliance in 1999, and United Future in 2002 have had more than five percent of the party 
vote.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 Notably New Zealand’s Green Party has so far not obtained any ministerial 
portfolios, despite having cleared the 5% party-vote threshold in every election it has 
contested (since 1999). Only in the 1999-2002 parliament did the Greens have a 
confidence and supply agreement with the government. Thus we can divide the parties 
other than Labour and National into two categories: “micro-parties” that enter parliament 
with just a few MPs and despite missing the 5% threshold, and “mid-sized parties” that 
clear the threshold. Some parties, such as ACT, New Zealand First, and United Future 
have been in one category in one election and the other at other times. Only the Greens 
have consistently been a threshold-clearing mid-sized party.  
 Micro-parties and Legacy Politicians.
 Why, then, is there a large number of micro-parties in the New Zealand 
parliament?  We argue that the answer lies partly in electoral-system provisions—not 
only the one-seat alternative threshold for proportional representation, but also the 
retention of the special Maori districts even under MMP
 As we saw above (see Table 3), New 
Zealand under MMP has had a relatively high number of parties with at least one seat in 
parliament, but a relatively low effective number of parties.  In fact, micro-parties have 
been a consistent feature of New Zealand’s MMP-era parliaments. For instance, of the 
eight parties represented in the parliament elected in 2011, three (ACT, Mana, and United 
Future) have one seat each and one other party (Maori Party) has three seats.  With the 
exception of Mana, each of these earned ministerial concessions from National in the 
post-electoral bargaining (as indeed they had done in 2008).  
22
                                                 
22 As discussed in greater detail below, Maori voters under both the SMP and MMP systems have had the 
option of voting in separate single-member districts set aside to ensure representation of the Maori. The 
Royal Commission had recommended abolishing the Maori districts as unnecessary under a proportional 
system, but waiving the usual party-vote threshold for parties representing Maori. 
. However, these factors are 
insufficient to explain the micro-parties, the persistence of which also depends, we argue, 




bargaining. There is also another  (and probably relatively minor) factor, the issue of 
parliamentary compensation, subsidy, and support for parties. 
 As noted above, New Zealand electoral rules require political parties to win five 
percent of the party vote or at least one district seat to be eligible for proportional-
representation seats.  The low alternative threshold allows for micro-parties to survive 
with ease as long as these parties have at least one politician with a local support base.  
Interestingly, these micro-parties are actually splinter parties of a large party, Labour or 
National. United Future’s party leader, Peter Dunne, was a longtime Labour politician 
with strong support in a wealthy suburb of Wellington.  In 2005 the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act, directly affecting Maori customary rights, saw the creation of the Maori 
Party when some Maori politicians defected from the Labour Party. The National Party 
had politicians split from it in 1993 to create the New Zealand First Party led by Winston 
Peters and the ACT Party led at the 2011 election by John Banks.23  While the populist 
New Zealand First has sometimes been a micro-party dependent on Peters winning his 
electorate (Tauranga, till he was defeated in 2005) and other times has cleared the 
threshold (as in 1996, 2005, and 2011), throughout it has been a party dependent 
primarily on the personal appeal of its leader, whose career spans back to the SMP era. 
ACT Party, on the other hand, managed to win 6-7% of the party vote in the first three 
MMP elections, but in the three subsequent elections it would not have been represented 
had it not won an electorate seat. In 2011, its electorate (Epsom, in Auckland) was the 
only seat it won. The importance of the one-seat threshold and legacy politicians is 
especially observable in the career of Jim Anderton. He was a longtime Labour MP in the 
Christchurch era, first elected in 1984, who split off to lead the Alliance.24
                                                 
23 A Labour defector, former Finance Minister Roger Douglas, was also a co-founder of ACT. 
 This party 
split during its coalition with Labour between the 1999 and 2002 elections, with 
Anderton leaving to form a vehicle officially registered as Jim Anderton’s Progressive 
Coalition (rendering Alliance both without a prominent politician to win a district and too 
small to clear the threshold). Anderton’s safe seat continued to allow his party to win one 
or two seats (Table 1) as long as he remained an MP, but when he retired before the 2011 
election, he shut down his Progressive party. The one-seat threshold, then, has been a 




major factor in why New Zealand has so many micro-parties.  Needless to say, these 
have implications for the complexity of post-election coalition negotiations that were 
depicted in Table 4.  
 A second reason for micro-parties and legacy politicians is the nature of the Maori 
special seats.  In the New Zealand system, the Maori special seats, which already 
existed under FPTP, are super-imposed on the whole country; that is, every voter resides 
in both a general district and a Maori district, and if the voter is of Maori descent, he or 
she may choose which one to register to vote in.25
 
 Currently, there are seven Maori 
district seats; the number is adjusted according to the size of the Maori electoral roll.   
A Maori enrolled voter receives the Maori district ballot as well as the party vote ballot 
(which, counting for nationwide representation, is the same for all voters).  Maoris 
historically identified with the Labour Party, thus prior to 2005, Maori MPs were mainly 
Labour.  However, in 2005 the former Labour MPs who formed the Maori Party were 
able to tap into this constituency base and the new party won four of the seven Maori 
special seats.  In 2008, the Maori Party kept its four seats but in April 2011, a split saw 
one of its MPs establish the rival Mana Party, which retained its one seat in 2011.  
Similar in effect to the low threshold levels for the parties competing in the general 
electorate, the Maori special seats have aided in the success of these micro-parties in the 
MMP era. Without MMP and its mechanical effects, there may never have been one 
separate party for Maori voters, let alone two of them. However, combined with the 
expectation that under MMP single-party majority governments are unlikely, having the 
separate Maori districts has created a further incentive to split off from a major party and 
possibly represent this constituency with a party that can engage in post-electoral 
bargaining for ministerial positions and policy concessions. We now turn to a discussion 
of how smaller parties have related to the major parties in government formation. 
Post-electoral bargaining over executive posts and policy
                                                 
25 In the voter registration period, citizens are asked whether they claim Maori ethnicity and, if so, if they 
would like to be enrolled in the Maori roll. 
. The political 
consequences of a proportional electoral system point to the relative likelihood of 
coalition governments instead of single-party majority cabinets.  As such, the 




the electoral system is insufficient for explaining the types of coalition that form, or 
accounting for the presence of the micro-parties in sometimes prominent roles in 
government. In the New Zealand case, coalition arrangements are quite varied and have 
had features that present challenges in classifying them.  Of the six governments formed 
in the MMP era, most are technically minority governments, despite the confidence-and-
supply agreements with supporting parties (Table 4).  Since 2005, New Zealand 
governments have been innovative in cabinet formation with several small and micro-
parties supporting the large party in a coalition but absolving themselves of collective 
cabinet responsibility by remaining outside of cabinet.  The Labour government of 2005 
was a four-party coalition that included the Progressives, New Zealand First, and United 
Future.  Each of the party leaders of these small parties (micro-parties in the case of 
United Future and Progressives) held ministerial posts.  The United Future leader held 
the post of Minister of Revenue while the NZ First leader became Foreign Affairs 
Minister yet both of them were formally not considered cabinet members in order for 
their parties not to be bound by cabinet collective responsibility outside the areas of the 
portfolios.  In 2008, the National government continued this practice, entering a 
partnership with ACT, United Future as well as Maori Party.  This arrangement 
continued following the 2011 election. 
 These innovative arrangements of holding ministerial appointments and rank but 
staying outside of cabinets are unique but have not necessarily spared the micro-parties of 
incumbency responsibility and costs. At times the supporting parties have been able to 
vote against cabinet policy such as the case of the United Future voting against the 
emission trading scheme (ETS) in 2008.  Miller and Curtin (2011), in their study of the 
costs of coalition, provided evidence that small parties in coalition governments have 
paid the price by losing parliamentary seats in subsequent elections.  Using the 2011 
general election as an example, the United Future lost one of its two MPs and the ACT 
Party lost three of its four, despite not being bound to cabinet responsibility outside their 
own ministerial positions. 
 Why, then, does this type of minority government exist in New Zealand?  The 
impact of MMP on the New Zealand model is part of the story, but a critical factor is the 




threshold for seat allocation, in particular the alternative to the party-vote threshold, has 
unwittingly stimulated the growth of micro-parties and thereby enhanced the leverage of 
legacy politicians.  The proliferation of political parties led by ambitious seekers of 
executive portfolios has created complications for coalition formation.  With limited 
options from left to right spectrum and the requirements for coalitions of at least four 
parties the innovation to create governments that are technically minority governments, 
yet provide pivotal roles to micro-parties, has come to typify the New Zealand experience.   
 Furthermore, the consequence of New Zealand’s Westminster parliamentary 
tradition cannot be ignored in explaining the prevalence of minority governments.  As 
Boston (2011, p. 80) argues, “[g]iven the uncomplicated and predictable nature of 
government formation under the first-past-the-post electoral system, New Zealand had no 
need to develop the kind of formal and informal rules that characterize the process in 
most countries with proportional representation.”  As New Zealand shifted to MMP, 
many of the formal and informal rules where never revised.  Boston (2011) notes that 
New Zealand coalition negotiations are unencumbered and tend to be ‘free-style 
bargaining environment’ (p. 82) as there are no constitutional provisions to the 
appointment of a formateur or informateur, nor are there explicit rules on how the inter-
party bargaining is to be conducted.  In addition, there is no constitutional constraint on 
the duration of government formation or the need for an investiture vote (Boston 2011).  
We can infer from the absence of these formal constitutional constraints and informal 
rules increased incentives both to form minority governments and to seek innovative 
ways of establishing cooperation among multiple parties. The combination of an MMP 
rule allowing parties to gain proportional representation seats even if they fall below 5%-
-provided they win one district--with an unusually informal parliamentary executive 
structure makes for significant incentives to splinter parties. All that is needed is an 
assurance of one safe seat for a micro-party, and then even if its party vote is not 
sufficient for a second seat, that (one-MP) party may be in a pivotal bargaining position. 
In the government following the 2011 election, United Future (with one safe seat for its 
leader, Peter Dunne, who has held it since 1984), ACT (with what otherwise would be a 
safe National seat in Auckland), plus the Maori Party (which wins only in Maori districts), 




 The flexibility of inter-party relationships in New Zealand under MMP is 
demonstrated even further by the case of a consistently mid-sized party, by our definition: 
the Green Party, which has cleared the threshold in every election since 1999, and in 
2011 elected 14 MPs. Despite its consistent middle size, the Greens have never held 
ministerial positions. However, they have had various policy-based relationships with 
Labour-led governments and in specific policy areas even with National.   
 The Greens supported the Labour–Progressive minority coalition of 1999-2002 
via a confidence-and-supply agreement, which entailed no executive posts for the Green 
Party, but offered them policy influence. The two parties diverged in a very public way 
over the government’s intention to lift a moratorium on the importation of genetically 
modified crops.26
 In the run-up to the 2005 election, Greens and Labour both campaigned on a 
series of pro-environment policies, including the possible introduction of a carbon tax.
 As a result of the disagreement, Labour PM Helen Clark called the 
2002 election a few months early. In the campaign the Greens pledged that they would 
not support a government that would lift the moratorium. Following that election, Labour 
and Progressives were able to obtain support on confidence and supply from the United 
Future Party (which won 8 seats, its strongest showing to date). The Greens, who also 
increased their support from 7 to 9 seats, went into opposition. By standing firm on an 
issue, the Greens cemented their reputation as a policy-seeking party. 
27 
During the campaign, the Greens publicly indicated an intention to assume cabinet 
positions.28 However, the election did not give these two parties, plus Progressives, a 
majority in parliament. Labour instead signed confidence and supply agreements with 
United Future and New Zealand First, both of which vetoed a Green presence in the 
cabinet. During the life of that government, Greens had only a “Cooperation Agreement” 
and a role of “Spokesperson” on energy efficiency and a “Buy Kiwi Made” campaign.29
                                                 
26 See "Greens given GM warning" New Zealand Herald March 6, 2002. The narrative here also draws 
heavily on Carroll (2005). 
 
27 “Labour takes Green road,” New Zealand Herald 31 August 2005; “Concessions squeezed out of 
Labour,” New Zealand Herald 18 October 2005.  
28 “Greens demand two posts in Cabinet,” 15 September 2005. 
29 “Labour-led Government Co-operation Agreement with Greens,” 17 October 2005 (accessed by authors 




Thus the 2002-05 term of parliament featured further examples of the sort of flexible 
inter-party arrangements that we discussed above. In addition to this being the 
government that pioneered the concept of ministers outside cabinet, it also had the 
unusual situation of what was technically an opposition party (because Greens were not 
committed to supporting the government on confidence and supply)30
 In the final months of the government, prior to the 2008 election, the Green Party 
backed the Labour government’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) when the United 
Future party invoked the “agree to disagree” clause in its confidence and supply 
agreement and announced it would vote against. The Greens undertook a consultation 
process with their supporters over whether to accept the ETS, which was much weaker 
than the carbon tax they (and Labour) had promised in 2005. In the end, they supported 
the ETS in exchange for the inclusion of a provision offering credits to homeowners who 
installed insulation.
 serving as the 
government’s official voice on some policy issues.  
31 Even under the National-led government of 2008-11, which 
significantly revised the ETS to be more favorable to business and farmers,32 the Greens 
maintained a written agreement with the government to pursue some policies of mutual 
agreement, such as home insulation and regulation of natural health products.33 These 
various examples thus show a case of a mid-sized party that enjoys representation thanks 
to the MMP system--never being dependent on winning districts to enter parliament34
                                                 
30 In fact, the party went so far as to issue a press release on 19 October 2005 saying the presence of New 
Zealand First and United Future meant the government was “bad news for New Zealand workers”. 
--
31 “Labour wins crucial votes on emissions trading plan,” New Zealand Herald, 27 August 2008. 
32 The amendments to the ETS secured the support of the now National-aligned United Future. In addition, 
the Maori Party was pivotal, and for its support obtained a provision allowing carbon credits for the 
planting of trees on tribal land. See  “Emissions trading money scramble,” The Press (Christchurch), 23 
November 2009, and “‘Sellout’ claim over ETS deal,” The Press (Christchurch), 24 November, 2009. The 
staunchly pro-market ACT, also a National partner, voted against the amended ETS (preferring no ETS at 
all). 
33 “Memorandum of Understanding Between The New Zealand National Party and The Green Party of 
Aoteoroa New Zealand”, dated 8 April 2009, accessed from the Green Party website in November, 2009. 
34 The Greens won an electorate (Coromandel) once, in 1999, thanks to some informal cooperation with 
the Labour Party, which did not withdraw its candidate from the district, but did encourage supporters to 




and employing a wide range of different tactics to enhance its policy influence despite so 
far never having one of its MPs appointed to a ministerial post. 
 What is distinctive about the Greens in the New Zealand party system is their 
being a policy-based mid-sized party. Other parties have tried to carve out a niche in the 
policy space, but have failed to remain consistently over the threshold (ACT, NZF). 
United Future once has surpassed the threshold, in 2002, with the aid of an alliance with a 
conservative Christian group, but its support subsequently declined. It even tried to 
reposition itself as an outdoorsman’s party in 2011 by placing campaign signs on the 
South Island against a pesticide being used to combat invasive pests, but received little 
electoral payoff and retained only the seat of its leader (on the North Island). 
 Thus so far, only the Greens have enjoyed middle-party status.  New Zealand’s 
lack of mid-sized policy-based parties other than the Greens stands in marked contrast to 
Germany, where in most elections since 2005 there have been three such parties: Free 
Democrats as a liberal pro-business party (which has been in many coalitions dating back 
to the early postwar years), Greens (in coalition cabinets with the Social Democrats from 
1998-2005), and the Left (which has not had federal ministerial posts).  
 As for New Zealand’s micro-parties, their future is uncertain. First of all, those 
that are dependent on the legacy politician who founded the party may not outlast the 
eventual retirement or defeat of that leader. As noted, the Progressive Coalition has 
already shut down with the retirement of Jim Anderton. United Future has so far had only 
one election in which it could enter parliament without needing founder Peter Dunne’s 
district. New Zealand First has sometimes needed leader Winston Peters’s former 
Tauranga seat, and other times has cleared the threshold, as it did in 2011. (It also has a 
more consistent voting bloc and a policy profile.) Act is an intermediate case. It has 
staked out a position as a more liberal (in the sense of pro-market) party than National, 
and has won districts with different politicians in different elections. It also, as we noted, 
was large enough to qualify as a “mid-sized” party in the first three MMP elections (see 
Tables 1 and 3). Nonetheless, it has not had more than 7% of the vote since 2011, and 
remains vulnerable to failing to clear the threshold (as happened in 2008).  
 The other reason why the micro-parties might be threatened is if one of the 




implemented: the Commission recommended abolishing the one-district alternative 
threshold. The Commission’s final report states (p. 8) that the existing arrangement is 
“arbitrary and inconsistent” because it “gives voters in some electorates [districts] 
significantly more influence over the make-up of parliament than voters in other 
electorates.” Under the proposal--which would have to be accepted by parliament to 
become law--a party could still enter parliament by winning one or more districts, but 
doing so would not qualify it for participation in proportional allocation. Without the 
possibility of winning additional seats, the attractiveness of voting for--or even forming--
a micro-party might diminish. As a partial counterweight to eliminating the one-seat 
alternative threshold, the Electoral Commission has recommended lowering the party-
vote threshold from 5% to 4%,35
 
 as in fact the Royal Commission initially had 
recommended in 1986. 
Party financing
 For the large parties, National and Labour, the sources of party financing are well-
established.  For the smaller parties, on the other hand, party subvention by the Crown 
becomes their main source of income.  For the micro-parties, the party leader who is 
also an MP receives the extra stipend of a party leader besides the usual financial support 
that MPs receive.  For politicians with strong local support and in tandem with the low 
threshold for allocation of parliamentary seats, utility calculation of party politicians can 
. Besides the institutional factors of MMP as adopted in New 
Zealand and the pursuit of executive posts, one other factor creates an interesting 
incentive as it changes the utility calculation of party politicians.  In New Zealand, the 
state is the primary source of party funding for many parties.  Based on the size of 
parliamentary representation, political parties are given a subsidy in order for them to 
perform their elected duties, manage their parliamentary offices, as well as their 
electorate offices.  Salaries of Members of Parliament are also in accordance to seniority 
and position held as MPs.  For example, cabinet members have ministerial salaries in 
addition to their MP salaries.  A prime minister who is also a party leader receives a 
prime minister’s salary, an MP salary, as well as a stipend as party leader.   
                                                 
35 In fact, the Commission’s Report says that 3% would be preferable and would not be so low as to 
threaten government stability. However, it concludes such a change would be too drastic and politically 




favor defecting from a major party, forming a small party, increasing their chances of 
being a party leader (if elected) as well as their chances of being a player in future 
coalition government negotiations.  Since 1996 New Zealand has seen many micro-
parties with varied lifespans but with a decidedly unequivocal impact on the party system 
and coalition formation.  In fact, from 1999 onwards each of the governments had at 
least one coalition partner with a ministerial appointment that can be considered a micro-
party. 
 In this section we have seen how various features of the MMP system, when 
combined with the country’s flexible arrangements for inter-party cooperation in 
government-formation and policy-making, and party-financing laws, have contributed to 
the persistence of several micro-parties as well as the growth of one consistently mid-
sized party. We now turn our attention to the relationship between the two tiers of the 
electoral system--the issue of “contamination” between the SMP and list-PR systems that 
comprise MMP.  
 
Contamination and Dual Candidacies 
 In recent years, a substantial literature has grown up around the issue of so-called 
contamination effects in mixed-member systems.36
                                                 
36 Apparently the first use of the term, contamination, to refer to concurrent majoritarian and proportional 
balloting not being identical to the respective systems when used separately is Shugart and Carey (1992: 
239-42). They refer to cases of presidential elections using plurality and legislative elections using PR. In 
the literature on mixed-member systems, the concept of contamination appears to have been used first by 
Herron and Nishikawa (2001), who emphasized in a comparison of the Japanese and Russian MMM 
systems that the PR tier results in a lessened impact of the single-seat districts on the number of parties. 
 The concept essentially means that 
the effects of one tier may affect how the other tier works. The main direction of 
contamination (or “spillover”) discussed in the literature has been from the list tier to the 
nominal, resulting in more parties running and winning votes in the plurality races than 
would be expected if Duverger’s Law of plurality elections were constraining. The 
argument is typically that parties might expect to receive fewer list votes if they 




this behavior by parties results in their candidates obtaining votes even where they are not 
competitive in the district (Cox and Schoppa 2002).  
 Another variant of the contamination thesis is that parties that have incumbent 
MPs in districts might benefit from a “personal vote” cultivated by their MP (Karp 2009). 
Again, this argument assumes many voters will not split a ticket, and will vote for the list 
of the MP’s party. This form of contamination actually implies that the presence of a 
nominal tier with personal-vote earning MPs will reduce the fragmentation of the PR tier, 
given that smaller parties rarely have the opportunity to benefit from a personal vote of a 
district MP.  
 
Contamination effects and the number of parties 
 How does contamination, if present, affect the number of parties? On the one 
hand, the number of parties entering and receiving some significant vote shares in the 
single-seat districts might tend to be inflated, relative to a pure SMP system, by the 
presence of a list tier using proportional representation. A “reverse” version of the 
argument is that, despite proportional representation, the presence of SMP competition 
depresses the overall number of parties, because voters may cue on the major parties and 
their popular incumbents and then be reluctant to split their tickets. Obviously these two 
potential directions of contamination work against each other, and if both are present, we 
should see moderate multiparty competition dominated by the top two, and little 
difference in the effective number of parties across the two tiers. Parties other than the 
top two would be present in the districts, and would earn seats based on their party votes, 
but there would not be a large difference between the vote shares of parties in each tier. 
The alternative to the contamination thesis is that the two tiers behave as though they 
were separate SMP and PR systems: a multi-party system in the PR tier, but competition 
in the districts centered around two dominant parties. 
 The New Zealand case is especially auspicious for testing this thesis, given the 
change from SMP to MMP. Here we will do so by comparing pre-reform and post-reform 
elections in terms of the effective number of electoral parties. We will consider both the 
average of the various single-member districts before and after reform, as well as the 




have already seen, in a previous section, that while the pre-reform party system was 
essentially a two-party system in parliament, there was considerable third-party voting 
especially from the mid-1970s on. Here we will look closer at the trends by bringing the 
district level in. It is, after all, at the district level where most of the posited effects on 
voter behavior take place (Moser and Scheiner 2012). 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Figure 1 shows a graph with three trends in the effective number of vote-earning 
parties (Nv) since 1963: the national aggregate of the candidate (district) votes (solid 
circles and connecting line); the mean of the individual districts (open circles and dashed 
line); party list votes under MMP (triangles). Several noteworthy observations can be 
made. First of all, there was a mostly upward trend in the effective number of electoral 
parties (Nv) from 1975 onward, with the notable exception of 1987. (Perhaps one might 
discount the 1993 rise, given that the referendum that was expected to approve MMP was 
concurrent with this election.) Moreover, the national aggregate and district means track 
each other quite closely, signaling that the rise was not principally a result of a deficiency 
in what Cox (1997) refers to as “linkage”; that is, it was not due to different patterns of 
district competition being inflated when we project the districts up to the national level. 
There is some greater uptick in the national aggregate than there is for the district mean in 
the 1978-84 period, but not much. The two lines increase at almost the same rate again in 
1990-93. In other words, Duvergerian patterns of two-party competition were breaking 
down to some degree not only nationally, but also in the average district during these 
times. Nonetheless, we should not exaggerate the trend, because in no election was 
Nv>3.0 until 1993. 
 As for the MMP period, there was a major spike in Nv by all three measures  in 
1996, as we might expect. We might say there was substantial contamination from the 
party vote to the district vote, as the average district sees Nv rise to 3.3. However, there is 
also an apparent reduction of linkage, suggesting district patterns became more distinct 
than they had been pre-reform. We see evidence for this in the fact that the national 
aggregate Nv based on candidate votes was closer to that based on party-list votes than it 




 Then, with each passing election under MMP, there has been a downward trend in 
Nv based on candidate votes (both aggregate and district mean), even in years when Nv 
based on party votes turned upward, as it did in 2002 and, more modestly in the 2005-11 
period. Strikingly, the district mean Nv is lower in the most recent three elections under 
the MMP era than it was in any election in the later SMP period of 1978-93, except for 
1987. This is, of course, evidence against one variant of the contamination thesis, because 
a case could be made that the average single-seat district is more “Duvergerian” under the 
proportional mixed-member system than it was during a time when such districts were 
the only game in town. 
 The overall decline in fragmentation from its high point with the first MMP 
election suggests that the dominant trend is not so much contamination as it is the 
emergence of separate vote patterns in the two tiers.37
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 This is suggested most especially 
by the three recent elections when Nv on party votes has trended modestly upward again, 
but that based on electorate votes has been lower than in most of the elections of the latter 
pre-reform period.  
 It is worth noting that the pattern we see in Figure 1 in which the two tiers 
showing a distinct “psychological” effect (in Duverger’s terms) need not be typical of 
MMP. Compare Figure 2, which replicates what we saw in Figure 1, only for the case of 
Germany since 1953. Before unification in 1990, the mean district Nv was generally 
below 2.5, and hence quite “Duvergerian”. Moreover, there is little difference between 
the aggregate Nv for either nominal or list votes, suggesting little ticket splitting--a 
finding consistent with literature that directly addressed the phenomenon (e.g. Fisher 
1973). In the 1990s and especially in the 2005 and 2009 elections, on the other hand, the 
mean district has become notably more fragmented. All three indicators have turned 
sharply upward, and the somewhat larger gap between nominal and list votes implies 
more ticket-splitting as well (confirmed in a study of the 1998 election by Gschwend, 
Johnston, and Pattie, 2003), but not--critically--to the extent of keeping anything like a 
                                                 
37 Even as early as the second MMP election, Karp, Vowles and Banducci (2002) noted that split-voting 
followed a predictable pattern, with “strategic defections” away from parties that were not viable in the 




Duvergerian equilibrium in the single-member districts. In fact, Germany’s mean district 
Nv has not been below 2.5 since 1983, and rose to 2.9 in 2005 and 3.5 in 2009. Thus, at 
least over several recent elections, the two MMP systems seem to be diverging. Germany 
seems to be experiencing contamination from the PR tier to the nominal, whereas in New 
Zealand the two tiers are showing distinct patterns--two-party dominance in the single-
seat districts, but considerable third-party voting on the PR vote.38
 
 
Dual candidacy and personal-vote contamination effects 
 As we noted previously, some variants of the contamination thesis imply that 
large parties benefit from the “personal vote” cultivated by their incumbent MPs, and that 
this results in those parties that win many plurality races also performing especially well 
on the party-list vote. We have already cast some doubt on this form of contamination, by 
observing a recent growth in the gap between Nv  based candidate and party votes.39
                                                 
38 The Scottish and Welsh MMP systems appear to be in between the effects we show here for Germany 
and New Zealand: a significantly lower Nv for the nominal tier compared to the list, but also average Nv in 
the districts that is greater than 3.0 (Crisp, et al, 2012). 
 
There are other possible forms of cross-tier contamination, however, which we take up in 
this section.  In particular, the practice of dual candidacy may create important cross-tier 
contamination effects.  We could observe contamination on the intra-party dimension, 
meaning how parties and candidates relate to one another and how much incentive 
legislators have to cultivate connections to a locality (Shugart 2005). Specifically, intra-
party contamination could mean either district-level electoral competition affording less 
local representation and accountability than a pure SMP system, or the list tier becoming 
“personalized” and “localized” in a way that would be unusual if the system were entirely 
a list proportional system (assuming lists are closed, as they are in New Zealand). At least 
in the New Zealand context, the former direction of possible contamination--weakening 
of district-level incentives on politicians--is controversial and perceived as normatively 
“bad” due to the perceived illegitimacy of dual candidacy. The other direction of 
39 Horiuchi, Shugart, and Vowles (2013), analyzing the effect of redistricting on the vote in New Zealand, 
find evidence for a personal vote of incumbents, who tend to obtain fewer candidate votes from voters who 
were not in their district prior to redistricting. However, they do not find evidence for contamination, as 




contamination likely would be considered “good” if it were perceived to be functioning. 
The consideration of how contamination works on the intraparty dimension in New 
Zealand is tied up in the issue of dual candidacy--the right of candidates to stand for 
office simultaneously in a district and on a party list. 
 In New Zealand, as in Germany and Japan but unlike in Taiwan, dual candidacies 
are allowed. In Germany, there seems little controversy over the practice, in contrast to 
the deep controversy found in Japan, where the “best loser” provision by which parties 
may choose to rank their lists may exacerbate perceived illegitimacy of dual candidacy. 
In New Zealand, the major parties, Labour and National, have tended to have a majority 
of their candidates run in both tiers simultaneously; in recent elections, the percentage has 
been 70% or higher. The Green Party likewise has dually nominated most of its 
candidates, including 97% of them in 2011. The micro-parties’ behavior has been 
somewhat variable. (Data from Vowles 2012.)  
 Dual candidacy has increasingly come under scrutiny and criticism. In fact, it was 
explicitly one of the provisions subject to the review of MMP following the referendum 
of 2011, under the Electoral Referendum Act of 2010. A case can be made that dual 
candidacy can be an efficient and desirable feature of a mixed-member system--”good 
contamination”, in a sense. Allowing dual candidacy means that parties have incentive to 
nominate high-quality personnel in districts that they may have little chance of winning. 
If dual candidacy were banned, a party might be disinclined to risk wasting a good 
candidate in a likely losing district contest, and instead ensure the candidate a place in 
parliament via a good rank on the party list. This risk would be especially acute for 
parties that expect to win seats only, or primarily, via the list. For instance, a party like 
the Greens, were there no dual candidacy, would be unlikely to nominate its best 
candidates in districts, because it depends on the party vote to gain seats. As the New 
Zealand Electoral Commission put it in its final report from the MMP review: “Without 
dual candidacy, MMP elections would be poorer contests” (Electoral Commission, 2012: 
9). 
 A positive feature of dual candidacy is that it may encourage greater local 
representation than either a pure SMP or PR system would do. If MPs elected via the list 




representatives that they can contact for assistance in more than just the party that won 
the most votes in their area. Evidence from the parliament elected in 2011 appears to bear 
this out. In National, eleven dual-listed MPs who won their seat via the party list maintain 
electorate offices and often identify themselves by titles such as “List MP based in 
[electorate name]”. Labour has eight list MPs who follow a similar strategy of 
maintaining an electorate office.40 Even Greens, despite not coming close to winning an 
electorate, maintain several “Electorate Offices” although in fact, the offices are shared 
between multiple MPs and the offices are located in just a few cities where the party has 
its greatest strength. This pattern fits a party that is less geographically focused in its 
platform, but that has mainly an urban constituency. As for the fourth largest party, New 
Zealand First, in 2011 all but the leader, Winston Peters, were dual nominees and all but 
two of their MPs maintain electorate offices.41
 The biggest controversy over dual candidacy stems from incumbents losing their 
district race yet remaining in parliament via the party list. That these legislators are 
sometimes referred to by names like “zombies” or “back-door MPs” calls attention to 
their perceived illegitimacy. Despite the controversy, there is little objective evidence that 
it is a major phenomenon of New Zealand experience with MMP. For example, Vowles 
(2012) shows that overall turnover of MPs from one election to the next actually has been 
greater under MMP than it was under SMP. Moreover, from 1999 through 2011, only 
once has the percentage of incumbent MPs defeated in a district race but remaining in 
office due to the list been above 10% of all district MPs (in 2005); it was only 2.9% in 
2011. Moreover, most of these district losers who remain by winning a list seat retire 
after just one more parliamentary term (Vowles 2012).  
  
 The controversy over dual candidacy thus does not seem based in the actual 
results of elections in New Zealand. Moreover, if New Zealanders wanted to remove the 
possibility of district losers continuing, a simple “incumbent defeat assurance” provision 
could be inserted into the law as follows: a losing district incumbent whose own 
                                                 
40 Labour and National each have a few MPs who ran only on a list. Some of these were recruited from the 
private sector for their policy expertise (e.g. trade or health), while others represent minority ethnic 
communities. Some of these list-only candidates set up offices upon being elected, while others did not. 




candidate vote trails his or her party’s vote in the district is skipped on the list. In this 
way, if the MPs in question lost because their party became less popular (which will often 
be a nationwide swing, and not a specifically local effect) they can retain their seat if they 
are sufficiently valued by their party as to have a list rank that permits their election. 
However, if they lose because they are less popular than their party, they are done--the 
list can’t “save” them from rejection by their electorate. Such a proposal is discussed in 
the Electoral Commission’s on-line Proposals Paper during the MMP review, although 
not specifically recommended.42
 
 In the end, the Commission recommended no change to 
the dual-candidacy provision. 
Conclusion 
 
 Fifteen years after the switch from SMP to MMP, not all New Zealanders are 
totally convinced by the merits of MMP as evidenced by the modest majority obtained by 
the current system at the referendum of 2011.  The Royal Commission of 1985-86, 
which originally proposed the MMP system, certainly anticipated many of the well-
known mechanical effects of MMP--particularly the high degree of proportionality--as 
the German example was available as a reference.   
 Yet, little did anybody anticipate that beyond the mechanical effects, the switch to 
MMP has resulted in some features of New Zealand politics that are distinctive. For 
example, the effective number of parties in the country has actually turned out to be 
somewhat lower than in Germany, despite the broad similarity of the systems. In recent 
years, the two cases have diverged, with Germany becoming more fragmented in both the 
nominal and list tiers. By contrast, in New Zealand, it seems that the tiers may be 
diverging from one another, as the two traditional parties, Labour and National, continue 
to dominate the district competition while various other parties combine for 20–25% of 
the party vote and a comparable share of the seats. New Zealand is characterized by many 
more very small parties than is Germany, which we attributed to the incentives of both 
the alternative threshold (one district victory being sufficient to win proportional 
                                                 
42 See http://www.mmpreview.org.nz/proposals/dual-candidacy (last accessed 27 February 2013). The 




representation) and the attractiveness of entering cabinets or becoming a support partner 
to either major party. This latter feature may be subject to change in the future, as the 
“legacy politicians” who founded several of the smaller parties eventually retire and 
especially if the Electoral Commission’s recommendation to abolish the alternative 
threshold is followed.  
 In surveying the effects of several mixed-member systems, Shugart and 
Wattenberg (2001b) asked whether they could offer “the best of both worlds”. While any 
such conclusions are necessarily normative, our overview of the consequences of MMP 
in New Zealand suggests that the answer may be yes. On the one hand, the system is 
overall proportional, as expected from its mechanical effect. On the other hand, voting in 
the single-seat districts has become relatively concentrated on the two main parties, and 
the presence of the nominal tier appears to allow for some degree of personal vote. In fact, 
legislators appear to maintain contact with local constituents (e.g. through electorate 
offices) even in districts where a different party has won the local contest. In these ways, 
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NEW ZEALAND ELECTORAL STATISTICS, 1996-2011 
 
Party  1996  1999 2002 2005  2008  2011 
National       Vote % 33.8 30.5 20.9 39.1 44.9 47.3  
  Seats* 44 (30, 14) 39 (22, 17) 27 (21, 6) 48 (31, 17) 58 (41, 17) 59 (42, 17) 
Labour Vote % 28.2 38.7 41.3 41.1 34.0 27.5 
  Seats  37 (26, 11) 49 (41, 8) 52 (45, 7) 50 (31, 19) 43 (21, 22) 34 (22, 12) 
NZ First Vote % 13.4  4.3 10.4  5.7  4.1  6.6 
  Seats  17 (6, 11)  5 (1, 4) 13 (1, 12)  7 (0, 7)  0  8 (0, 8) 
Act Vote %   6.1  7.0  7.1  1.5  3.7  1.1 
  Seats   8 (1, 7)  9 (0, 9)  9 (0, 9)  2 (1, 1)  5 (1, 4)  1 (1, 0) 
Alliance Vote % 10.1  7.7  1.3  0.1  0.1  0.1 
  Seats 13 (1, 12) 10 (1, 9)   0  0  0  0 
Green Vote % --  5.2  7.0  5.3  6.7 11.1 
  Seats --  7 (1, 6)  9 (0, 9)  6 (0, 6)  9 (0, 9) 14 (0, 14) 
Progressive Vote % -- --  1.7  1.2  0.9 -- 
  Seats  -- --  2 (1, 1)  1 (1, 0)  1 (1, 0) -- 
United Future Vote %  0.9  0.5  6.7  2.7  0.9  0.6 
  Seats  1 (1, 0)  1 (1, 0)  8 (1, 7)  3 (1, 2)  1 (1, 0)  1 (1, 0) 
 Maori Vote % -- -- --  2.1  2.4  1.4 
  Seats -- -- --  4 (4, 0)  5 (5, 0)  3 (3, 0) 
 Mana Vote % -- -- -- -- -- 1.1 
  Seats -- -- -- -- --  1 (1, 0)  
Others  Vote %  7.5  6.1  3.6  0.1 2.4  3.3 
Total seats  120 120 120 121 122 121 
 
* Percentages are for party-list votes. For each party, seats are given as: total 








Least Squares Index Values of Disproportionality: Japan, New Zealand, 
Germany 
 
Country (time period) Electoral System Mean  Min. Max. 
Japan (1996-2012)  MMM   14.53   8.52 25.73 
Taiwan (2008-2012)           MMM   12.98   9.07   
16.89 
New Zealand (1996-2011) MMP    2.69   1.13  3.84 
West Germany (1953-87) MMP    2.2   0.5  4.69 







Table 3. Post-SMP Parliamentary Parties and Effective Number of Parties (Ns) 
________________________________________________________________      
           % seats, third party 
   # of parties  Ns  (and identity) 
1996   6   3.76  14.2 (New Zealand First)  
1999   7   3.45   8.3 (Alliance) 
2002   7   3.76  10.8 (New Zealand First) 
2005   8   2.95   5.8 (New Zealand First) 
2008   7   2.78   7.4 (Green) 
2011   8   2.98  11.6 (Green) 
Mean (6 elections)  7.2   3.28   9.7 
________________________________________________________________ 






 Table 4. Party Composition of MMP Governments in New Zealand 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Year   Main party  Coalition partners with ministerial positions 
1996   National   New Zealand First 
1999   Labour  Alliance*  
2002   Labour   Progressive, United Future 
2005   Labour    Progressive, NZ First, United F uture 
2008   National  ACT, Maori, United Future 
2011   National  ACT, Maori, United Future 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: New Zealand Electoral Commission. 
Italics indicate parties that entered parliament via winning at least one district, rather than 
obtaining over 5% of the party vote. 
All coalition partners indicated had their ministerial positions “outside cabinet” with the 
exception of New Zealand First in 1996 and Alliance (1999) and Progressive (2002 and 
2005), which were full cabinet partners in those governments. 
*In addition, the Green Party was in a confidence and supply agreement with Labour 

















 Figure 2. Effective number of parties over time in Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
